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W E S T G E R M A N Y

12 October 1961

LUEBKE SAYS WEST MUST NOT GIVE AN INCH

Hamburg DPA in German to West Germany 1340 GMT 11 October 1961--L
(OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Summary) Hamburg--Addressing officers and staff of the Bundeswehr academy in Hamburg-Blankenese today, Federal President Luebke said that the Federal Republic would be a sincere and reliable partner of the West and would take part in shouldering the joint burden. In view of its special political and geographical position at the place where the Eastern bloc and NATO states meet, he stated, the Federal Republic felt it its duty to warn against any policy of abandonment. "Any loss of territory and prestige might bring about a crisis of confidence in the West, which would considerably weaken the will of all free nations for self-preservation," he said.

The President said that the firm alliance of the NATO powers was making it impossible for the Soviets to penetrate further into Europe. "The USSR knows full well that an attack on Europe would meet with the united resistance of the free nations; hence, it tries to proceed stage by stage. The first objective is the Soviet occupation zone in Germany. Now it is Berlin's turn; tomorrow it will be that of the Federal Republic and, the day after, that of our Western neighbors. The Soviet Union is proceeding along the line of least resistance to implement its policy of conquest, and it always speculates on the disunity of the free nations and their lack of desire for self-determination."

The Soviet Union, said the President, has used the territory of its satellites as a deployment area from which a break-through to the Atlantic would not be an impossible venture for a strong army. He said the democratic consciousness of the peoples of Western Europe had foiled the Soviet hope to incorporate all of the continent in the sphere of Soviet domination. "The clearest repudiation of communism came from our people, who had learned the lessons of their own past and knew that totalitarianism, whether from the left or from the right, could lead only to more injustice and misery."

Although today the "balance of terror" made war unlikely, the training of the Bundeswehr soldiers must not be neglected. "We must attain that maximum of fighting strength and defensive readiness that convinces all of our will to resist. This is the only way to withstand political blackmail and threats of peace," he added.

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Leubke said that national defense was not now a purely military task. The military chiefs should rouse in their troops affection for the state and for the Western way of life. In view of the measures taken by the East German communists, it was very easy to explain to the soldiers the meaning of service and defense.

The President added: "The Bundeswehr soldiers could be in the position of having to fight their own fellow countrymen. This problem is bound up with a conflict of feeling and conscience which can be resolved only by people who have firm moral ties with the political ideas of the Western world and of our Federal Republic. The soldiers must be aware that military action of Germans against Germans is possible only after a communist attack aimed at our complete subjugation." Yet, he said, such a conflict would be a most tragic event. "We know that the great majority of the soldiers on the other side would fight only under coercion."

BERLIN ONLY FIRST STAGE IN SOVIET AIMS

Munich Domestic Service in German 1900 GMT 11 October 1961--G

(Address by Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss on the program "Politics at First Hand")

(Summary) Dear listeners! While we are endeavoring to negotiate about a future government coalition in order to bring about a workable government, the struggle of world communism against the free world continues unswervingly. The shameful measures of the Soviet zone regime directed against its own people are particularly aimed at transforming the large concentration camp of Khrushchev and Ulbricht into a maximum security prison. However, our justified indignation at these measures must not blur the larger aspects. The Berlin crisis provoked by the Soviets is only one stage on the great road at the end of which is to stand communist world domination.

"With the measures in Berlin and in the zone, Khrushchev and Ulbricht want on the one hand to stabilize the regime and on the other hand to achieve technical and legal recognition of the partition of Germany through military threats, which include continued atomic explosions, and through diplomatic negotiations." Khrushchev is not only preparing to consolidate illegally acquired possessions; he is aiming at creating prerequisites for a further expansion of the communist movement and Soviet power. The Soviets are not aiming at dominating West Berlin immediately but at enforcing gradually the demands made in their 1959 draft for a peace treaty through their threats against the access roads.

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The connection between military threats and political action can also be noted in connection with the huge maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact states. The purpose of these maneuvers is surely not a lightning offensive. They are a great military demonstration designed to discourage right from the beginning the Western guarantor powers, particularly the Americans, from maintaining the access roads to Berlin, possibly by the use of force.

What is at stake and what must we do?

"1--The West must neither await nor simply accept unilateral acts. The West must make it clear to the Soviets with all means what their policy risks and from a certain point on initiate countermeasures.

"2--We must not make ourselves prisoners of the Soviet tactics, the aim of which is to prejudice the Western powers against us and to create distrust in Germany against the Western powers.

"3--We must avoid setting the so-called Western realism against the alleged Eastern irrealism, that is, to talk with the Soviets only about (what they consider as suitable for negotiations?) while the Soviets are not afraid of openly putting their farreaching and long-term aims on the table. In view of the right to self-determination of Germany and all European nations, the Soviets must be unmasked before the world public. The communist aggression must be seen precisely for what it is, that is, a permanent war against the free world which is to be continued until communism has taken over domination. The West cannot view communism from crisis to crisis as a pragmatic phenomena but must see all relations of factors--world revolutionary ideology, total setting of aims, and the technique of the continuous crisis and conflict--and act accordingly.

"4--The German people must know and stipulate with the allies what can be a topic of negotiations vis-a-vis the Soviets and what cannot be a topic of negotiations.

"5--The Federal Republic of Germany must realize which risks and sacrifices are to be taken together with the allies and must stipulate, in case the Soviets try to change the situation through unilateral acts, where our rights and interests begin about which there can be no negotiations and which cannot be a subject of discussion.

"6--The German people must, above all, realize the possibilities and limits of German policy and also about the extent of risks and obligations without which Berlin cannot be maintained and the Soviet advance cannot be repelled. Nothing is more necessary now than clarity and truth, soberness, and a real relationship between wishes on the one side and accomplishments on the other."

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This calls especially for a government and a coalition whose political forces unite not in order to pursue any policy jointly or to engage in a policy of joint lip service but in order to find a common basis for a policy of the right, possible, and necessary decisions; or, in other words, the historic catastrophe of the invasion of the Soviet Union in central Europe, for which Hitler opened the doors and the consequences of which the Western powers did not realize immediately, must be realized fully by all responsible political forces--whether in the government or in the opposition. This catastrophe calls for the joint readiness for a constructive counterpolicy. This policy must aim at winning back the political initiative, at contributing to the technical and scientific superiority of the free world, and, above all, at again bringing to bear its moral strength.

PRESS NOTES LUEBKE WARNING ON WEAKNESS

Review of West German Radio and Press for 12 October 1961--G

(Editorial Report) Virtually all West German newspapers on 12 October report on President Kennedy's news conference on 11 October, highlighting the point that Kennedy emphasized that no solution to the Berlin conflict is in sight but that the United States will carry out its commitments with all the means it is forced to use. Typical headlines are those of the independent DIE WELT of Hamburg--"No Solution of Berlin Conflict in Sight;" the progovernment GENERAL-ANZEIGER's "Berlin Problem not Easy to Solve, Kennedy States;" and the pro-opposition NEUE RHEIN-ZEITUNG's "Kennedy Hopes for Bonn Cooperation." Comment, however, is practically nil.

Most papers also highlight President Luebke's speech to Bundeswehr officers and the transfer of policemen to West Berlin and report on efforts to form a coalition government in Bonn.

In reporting West German President Luebke's speech to Bundeswehr officers, most papers highlight his warning to the West not to yield. The progovernment FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE headline proclaims "Luebke Demands a Maximum of Defense Preparedness," while the pro-opposition FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU plays up his statement that in the event of a communist attack the soldiers of the Bundeswehr may have to fight against their own countrymen. All reports quote Luebke's warning that any loss of territory or prestige will be a setback for the entire West and will weaken the fighting morale of the Western countries. The papers also note Luebke's point that the Soviets seized their occupation zone first, that they are trying to seize West Berlin, and that further moves against the Western neighbors of the Federal Republic will follow unless they meet united resistance.

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West Berlin Police Reinforcements

All papers report the move to strengthen the West Berlin police, with the West Berlin press being particularly outspoken. The progovernment DER TAG deplores the fuss made over the plan to transfer 20-40 West German policemen as a token reinforcement of the West Berlin traffic police, pointing out that it was obvious the communists would exploit this act. The paper writes: Washington should have read the protest letter and thrown it in the wastebasket. The plan would have been buried if unpleasant repercussions had been expected, and the cops would have stayed home. Now, however, Washington has taken an official stand on the matter and given it the value of an official action. The gentlemen in Pankow are gleefully rubbing their hands now that the West Berliners once again feel like little Henrys who did right but mistakenly receive a whacking from the teacher. Well, perhaps the new carbines will console us.

The independent BERLINER MORGENPOST adds: It was expected that the West would ignore the East German protest note, because it was obvious that Ulbricht wanted to use a minor matter to renew his assertion that West Berlin is a hotbed of aggression. The State Department obviously failed to understand this. They promptly did what Ulbricht expected and reacted. Although the State Department said that the U.S. Government will not accept the East German note, which went far beyond its target, he clearly indicated that Washington is opposed to the transfer of West Berlin traffic police to West Berlin. The United States, of course, will not reply to Ulbricht; this would be de jure recognition. But in reacting to "realities" it has replied to a clumsy threat; it has given the buildup for the internecine war and a de facto reply.

Coalition Talks

Most papers report that after the CDU/CSU and the FDP achieved rapid agreement on domestic problems negotiations on government policy have ended. The CDU/CSU and FDP commission in charge of the coalition talks will hold a joint meeting on 12 October to review the individual terms of the program. The papers add that personnel problems will be dealt with next week, but Adenauer's continued chancellorship will most likely not be contested. Adenauer, however, will probably promise to withdraw before the end of his term and the CDU/CSU is ready to give the FDP corresponding guarantees if desired.

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The independent ABENDPOST of Frankfurt in its lead story notes that Adenauer displayed a very conciliatory attitude in his talks with the FDP and even offered Mende the position of foreign minister. According to GENERAL ANZEIGER of Bonn, however, Mende dismissed this story as absolute nonsense. The pro-opposition ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG of Mainz feels that Brentano will remain as foreign minister as long as Adenauer is in office.

GENERALANZEIGER reports that Adenauer is willing to accept an invitation to the United States at once if he is reelected chancellor and that he welcomed this suggestion from Senators Humphrey and Javits. The paper notes that the Chancellor has long contemplated correcting German-American relations through personal intervention and that the trip would offer an opportunity to form a reliable concept in Western policy. The paper adds, however, that a conference of the Western foreign ministers should precede such a visit by Adenauer.

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COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEETING--The Political Committee of the Council of Europe is meeting in the West Berlin congress hall under the chairmanship of Emilio Batista. The questions of Great Britain's joining the Common Market and the further development of the EEC are on the agenda. Hallstein, chairman of the commission of the European Economic Community, who participated in the meeting as a guest, stated that his presence proves the close relationship between the European Economic Community and Berlin. Everything will be done to stabilize the economic and social situation of West Berlin and to give the Berlin people a feeling of security, he said. (Hamburg Domestic Television 1903 GMT 11 October 1961--G)

BORDER EVACUATIONS--A Soviet zone inhabitant who managed to escape across the Elbe said that 64 families had been evacuated from Boitzenburg. It is not known where they were taken. A conspicuously large number of frontier policemen have been brought to the area north of Schnackenburg to control peasants and agricultural workers harvesting sugar beet. (Hamburg DPA German Germany 2245 GMT 11 October 1961--L) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

BEA FLIGHTS TO BERLIN--British European Airways is to reduce the number of its daily flights to and from Berlin in the new winter timetable. Instead of 18 flights, the BEA is to fly 13 times daily as from November 1. Anthony H. Milward, director general of BEA, told journalists that BEA will nevertheless introduce additional flights should these prove necessary. The reduction in the number of flights is due to the dwindling number of refugees, he said. (Hamburg DPA German Germany 2045 GMT 11 October 1961--L) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)